Day 3 - Transition, Technology, People & Leadership
- John Lindquist - Director of Marine Development, Stabilis Solutions / President, Connecticut Maritime Association (CMA)
Houston has always fuelled the ships that load its cargo, but the bunker barge has rarely been this interesting. The Hormuz crisis sent fuel prices spiking and reminded owners how much of the world’s marine fuel depends on a handful of hubs. Closer to home, new suppliers have moved into the Gulf: BGN, the largest lifter of US LPG, launched a Houston retail bunkering business with Centerline Logistics in July 2026, a dedicated LNG bunkering facility is being developed for the Houston–Galveston area, and methanol has already been delivered barge-to-ship on the Channel.
Convened with IBIA, this panel looks at the market from the supply side of the hose: price risk and credit after a year of volatility, fuel quality and the disputes that follow an off-spec delivery, digital bunker documentation and delivery transparency, and how Gulf suppliers are preparing to deliver several fuels from the same barge fleet. Overhanging all of it is the IMO’s Net-Zero Framework, which by March will either have been adopted or delayed again, and which decides what a Gulf supplier should be stocking in 2030. If you buy, sell, finance or regulate marine fuel, this is the conversation to be in.
- John Lindquist - Director of Marine Development, Stabilis Solutions / President, Connecticut Maritime Association (CMA)
2026 put seafarers on the front pages for the worst reasons. Crews came under attack in the first days of the Hormuz crisis, some were killed, and for weeks around 20,000 mariners were trapped aboard ships in the Gulf with no safe way out. It was the starkest reminder in a generation that the industry’s most important asset is also its most exposed. It landed on a labour market already stretched by an officer shortage, an ageing workforce and a training system being asked to prepare crews for fuels and systems that barely exist yet.
This session looks at the market from both sides of the gangway. Where are shortages biting hardest: senior officers on gas carriers, the US-flag mariners the Maritime Action Plan now needs, or the towboat crews the inland fleet cannot find? Is training keeping pace, and who pays for it, when Washington wants 20% more academy cadets and owners want crews certified on ammonia and methanol? And what about the vulnerabilities the industry still treats as someone else’s problem: conflict-zone exposure, abandonment, criminalisation, fatigue and mental health? This is CMA’s human-element staple, rebuilt for the year that tested it.
Golden Pass shipped its first cargo on 23 April 2026, seven weeks into a crisis that had locked roughly a fifth of the world’s LNG supply behind Hormuz. The timing was an accident, but the consequence was not. US Gulf LNG became the marginal molecule of global gas security, exports rose by almost a quarter in the first half of the year, and every buyer in Europe and Asia re-read its contract book.
The panel covers the buildout as it now stands (what is commissioning, what is under construction, what is permitted and stalled) alongside the shipping consequences: charter cover for a fleet ordered against a different trade map, Panama risk on Gulf-to-Asia voyages in an El Niño year, and the pilots, tugs and terminal access needed for a class of ship arriving in ever-greater numbers. One framing note for anyone looking out of the hotel window: the big liquefaction terminals sit on neighbouring Gulf waterways, not on the Houston Ship Channel itself.
Whatever the IMO decides about carbon pricing, the fuel bill is already set by the market, and in 2026 that market was set by a war. With Brent hovering around $100 a barrel for much of the year, every percentage point of efficiency became a line on the P&L rather than a slide in a sustainability report. The technologies are no longer speculative: hull and propeller retrofits, air lubrication, wind-assisted propulsion, weather routing and just-in-time arrival all have years of operating data behind them.
This panel is about what actually pays back, and for whom. Which retrofits have delivered measured savings, and which only looked good on the test bed? How do owners and charterers split the gain when one pays for the kit and the other pays for the fuel, and are CII-linked charter clauses fixing that or making it worse? And in a port like Houston, where queues, fog and daylight restrictions shape every call, how much fuel is burned waiting rather than sailing? The session is focused on cost, holds whatever the regulation turns out to be, and is useful immediately whatever comes out of London.
- Paul Delouche - North America Director, Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore
- Ellie Besley-Gould - CEO, Sustainable Shipping Initiative
Every CMA programme has carried an energy-transition slot. In Connecticut that meant offshore wind. On the Gulf Coast it means carbon capture and storage, and 2026 showed both the momentum and the friction. Texas took over permitting of CO₂ storage wells at the end of 2025 and in September 2026 approved ExxonMobil’s Rose project, designed to store some 53 million tonnes beneath Jefferson County. At the same time Exxon shelved its Baytown low-carbon hydrogen plant for lack of buyers, Louisiana halted new storage-well applications, and Texas’s own regulators split publicly over the technology.
For shipping, the sharper question is not whether CCS happens but whether the Gulf model needs ships at all. Today’s projects run by pipeline to onshore storage and are built around industrial clusters. That raises questions for liquid-CO₂ carriers and barges, for the terminal and interface standards being written for them, and for onboard carbon capture, which can capture at sea but still needs somewhere to discharge. This is a clear-eyed look at where maritime has a real role in the Gulf’s biggest decarbonisation bet, and where it does not.
The offshore supply and subsea sector is a large, US-flag, Gulf-headquartered shipping market with its own asset cycle, and Washington has handed it a pipeline of work: a legislated schedule of Gulf of America lease sales, the most recent of which, in August 2026, drew bids from sixteen companies. Add a fleet that saw little newbuilding after the last downturn, and the conditions for a day-rate cycle are in place.
This session covers utilisation and day rates, fleet age and the economics of newbuilds against reactivations, Jones Act crewing constraints, and the read-across to CCS and remaining offshore wind support work. For deep-sea owners and financiers looking for US-flag exposure, this is the market they least understand.
- Jose Moraes - North Ameica Regional Offshore Manager, DNV
In March 2026, with fuel prices spiking, Washington suspended the Jones Act for sixty days, and around forty tankers moved cargo between US ports under the waiver. Supporters say the episode showed how rarely the domestic fleet needs supplementing; critics say it showed how badly the fleet needs expanding. Either way, the most argued-about law in American shipping has never been more live.
This session gives it the full treatment the programme has long promised: coastwise trade economics, the domestic fleet’s real capacity against the Action Plan’s ambitions, how waivers are requested and granted, and the offshore, CCS and LNG project work where Jones Act structuring is now a commercial constraint rather than a legal footnote. Bring your opinions; you will hear the other side’s too.
Artificial intelligence has moved through shipping in the usual order: overpromised, quietly deployed, and now embedded in voyage optimisation, chartering, claims, condition monitoring and port-call coordination while the industry was still arguing about definitions. The value is real and unevenly distributed.
The panel separates what is working from what is being sold: where AI has produced measurable savings rather than dashboards, what bad data actually costs, and who owns the data. On the other side of the same coin, maritime cyber is no longer hypothetical. Attacks on operators, terminals and OT systems are now frequent enough to be actuarial, and new US Coast Guard cyber requirements have raised the floor. On a waterway carrying this much hazardous cargo a cyber-physical incident is not an IT problem, and the operators, responders and lawyers who would handle one are all in the room.
- Senior Representative - Classification, ABS
The 2024 East and Gulf Coast port strike ended with a six-year contract and an automation truce that runs to 2030, which is long enough to plan around and not long enough to forget. Houston is where a highly automated private energy-terminal sector meets a unionised public container sector, which makes it the best place in the country to ask what the terminal of 2030 actually looks like.
The panel brings productivity and throughput data, lessons from the automation bargains struck in Rotterdam, Los Angeles and elsewhere, and a frank discussion of what terminal investment, job design and training look like on either side of the next agreement. Essential for anyone investing in, operating or depending on Gulf terminals.
CMA content has always been blue-water. Meanwhile the largest tank-barge operator in the United States is headquartered in Houston, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway carries a petroleum and chemical trade that would rank as a major national trade in its own right, and tows share the Ship Channel with the deep-sea fleet every hour of the day. This is a different industry, with a different regulatory frame, labour market and economics, and it is almost invisible on international maritime agendas.
This session covers the interface points that matter to everyone in the room: congestion and traffic management where barge and deep-draft traffic compete, the Subchapter M towing-vessel regime and what years of third-party inspection have taught operators, lock and waterway infrastructure, and the crew shortage that constrains the sector more sharply than tonnage does. If you have never had a reason to talk to the inland fleet, this is it.
The Commodores’ Debate is the most durable piece of intellectual property CMA owns, and it travels. Past and present Commodores take the floor with no script, no slides and no obligation to be diplomatic, and the audience sets the agenda. The starting question for Houston writes itself. The industry has spent three years managing geopolitical, regulatory and technological shocks with tools built for a stable world. What does good leadership look like when volatility is the operating condition rather than the exception? What are these leaders committing capital to, what are they refusing to commit to, and what do they think the rest of us are missing?
- Karrie Trauth - Executive Vice President of Shipping & Maritime / President, Shell /UK Chamber of Shipping
